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T A B L E O F A U T H O R I T I E S 
REFERENCES TO THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE WILL HEREAFTER 
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INCORPORATION OF PRIOR RECORD AND BRIEFS 
Tomasa Vigil herewith incorporates by reference her prior 
statement of facts and arguments based thereon as contained in her 
original Brief of Appellant before this Court* 
Appellant also recognizes the jurisdiction of this Court as 
poured over by Order of the Utah Supreme Court* 
Appellant hereby reaffirms her statement of the issues on 
appeal as previously set-out and as previously supported, except as 
additional argument as to those specific issues are set-out herein* 
All references to "Rule11 or "Rules" herein shall mean the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, unless otherwise specifically designated. 
PISPUTgp FACTS QW frPPBAI, 
The Appellant, Tomasa Vigil, believes that there still remains 
certain factual issues from the Record on Appeal (hereinafter 
"ROA") which this Court should consider and about which a material 
issue of interpretation exists between Appellant and Appellee. 
While both parties are citing the same Record on Appeal, 
Appellant believes that the following factual issues or conclusions 
from the facts remain in controversy and are improperly 
interpreted, asserted or determined by Mr* Nelson* 
1. There is no factual basis from the Record before this 
Court to know whether the trial judge, the Honorable David S. 
Young, excluded consideration of the Affidavit of Dr. McGlothlin 
clearly stating the Appellant had suffered permanent partial 
4 
disability as a result of her collision with Mr. Nelson in October 
1987. See Affidavit of Dr. McGlothlin (ROA page 77 to 81). 
Two possibilities exist as to this Affidavit. The first is 
that the trial judge did in fact exclude from consideration the 
Affidavit; or, secondly, the trial judge did not properly take into 
consideration the import or effect of such Affidavit for the 
purposes of a Summary Judgment proceeding. In either case, Mrs. 
Vigil maintains that either the failure to properly consider or the 
improper exclusion of the Affidavit of Dr. McGlothlin constituted 
material error in this case and should be reversed by this Court. 
Mrs. Vigil continues to maintain, for the reasons set-out in her 
Brief in Chief and as argued to the trial court, that the Affidavit 
of Dr. McGlothlin did not meet the clearly contradictory standard 
of Webster v. Seal, 675 P.2d 1170 (Utah 1983). 
2. Mrs. Vigil further maintains, even if this Court were not 
to consider the Affidavit of Dr. McGlothlin, that the totality of 
the findings from his written reports [or "reasonable inference" 
from those reports - particularly the September 21, 1992 report 
(ROA page 66 - 67)] is that Dr. McGlothlin's pre-deposition 
estimate of the total disability of Mrs. Vigil attributable to the 
accident was approximately two-thirds (2/3) of her present neck and 
back symptoms. This would be the logical deduction or "inference" 
in his ascribing one-third (1/3) of her injuries to pre-existing 
conditions. In his September 21st supplemental report, Dr. 
McGlothlin states: 
5 
11
 ... I would suggest that it is quite 
reasonably probable that at least one-third of 
the patient's expressed subjective complaints 
as well as clinical objective finding, i.e., 
restricted range of motion, etc., in the 
cervical column are reasonably apportioned to 
pre-existing degenerative disease." 
3. In addition to both the Affidavit and prior written 
medical reports of Dr. McGlothlin, Mrs. Vigil maintains that the 
aggregate import of the deposition testimony of Dr. McGlothlin was 
that she did, in fact, have permanent partial disabilities directly 
resulting from the automobile collision with Mr. Nelson in October 
of 1987. While Mrs. Vigil does not wish to reiterate and restate 
the previously cited portions of Dr. McGlothlin's deposition 
testimony to support this premise, she would respectfully refer the 
Court to the summary of such testimony contained on page 27 of her 
original Brief with specific references back to the portions of Dr. 
McGlothlin's deposition contained in the Record on Appeal. 
4* Independently of Dr. McGlothlin's testimony, there are 
the prior reported portions of the discovery testimony of Mrs. 
Vigil wherein she indicated that the Emergency Room physicians 
stated to her that she may suffer some permanent injury as a result 
of the collision, but that further treatment would probably not be 
effectual due to her age and circumstances (ROA pages 43-44). 
5. Finally, Mrs. Vigil has previously argued, and will 
supplement with further argument below, that for the purposes of a 
Summary Judgment proceeding her statement that she did not incur or 
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suffer any of the symptoms prior to the collision is fully 
admissible. This statement should be considered as corroborating 
evidence and is not ipso facto excluded (ROA pages 41-42 and 147-
150). See also Vigil/s original Brief on Appeal at pages 16-17; 
paragraphs 21-23. 
6. Appellant takes exception to the position of Appellee on 
the first line of Page 15 of his Brief, suggesting that Mrs. Vigil 
is looking around trying to "find" an expert to support her 
position of permanent disability. Mrs. Vigil believes that she has 
already established permanent partial disability through competent 
medical testimony, as well as other corroborating evidence, and 
that such suggestion by Mr. Nelson mischaracterizes the Record on 
Appeal before this Court. 
7. Mrs. Vigil concedes that she has not, to date, 
accumulated the $3,000 in medical expenses required by Utah Code 
Annotated §31A-22-309, but asserts that this test is totally 
independent of the permanent disability test. In point of fact, 
due to her age and the apparent paucity of specific surgical or 
other techniques to treat her condition, there is a possibility 
that she may never reach the required threshold medical level. 
Whether or not she does reach such standard is not an issue to be 
determined at Summary Judgment and should, by the Appellee's own 
admission, remain open until the time of trial. See Jepson v. 
State Department of Corrections. 846 P.2d 485 (Utah App. 1993). 
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EXCEPTION TO APPKTJ.KK'S STATEMENT OF RULE 56 STANDARDS 
Mrs. Vigil takes exception to the adequacy of the statement by 
Mr. Nelson in the Appellant's brief as to the applicable Rule 56 
standards. Mrs. Vigil would not disagree with the primary premise 
viz: the trial court is to construe the disputed issues of fact in 
favor of the party being moved against (Mrs. Vigil) and that the 
appeal court is to give no deference to the trial court's 
conclusions of law, but should review legal issues &§, novo. 
Mrs. Vigil's contention, however, is that the applicable Rule 
56 standards as properly applied to this case go substantially 
beyond this minimal premise, and require the Court to apply the 
following additional Rule 56 principles to the resolution of the 
facts before it in this case: 
1. Because a remedy (Rule 56) is preemptory, the Court in 
considering a Motion for Summary Judgment must view the facts and 
all reasonable inferences from those facts, in the light most 
favorable to the party being moved against. W. M. Barnes Co. v. 
gQhXO Natural pesQuyqg CQ,, 627 P.2d 56 at 59 (1981). 
2. It is not the purpose of Summary Judgment to attempt to 
judge the credibility of the averments or the parties, or to weigh 
evidence in any manner. For the purposes of Summary Judgment, it 
only takes one sworn statement under oath to dispute the averments 
and to remove the case from a proper Summary Judgment proceeding, 
larass/ supra- at 59. 
8 
3. In making its determination under Rule 56, it is of no 
moment that the evidence on one side may appear to be strong or 
even compelling. So long as there is a prima facia showing of a 
disputed issue of material fact, the Court should rule against the 
party seeking Summary Judgment, Barnes. supra. at 59. 
4. Because the Summary Judgment proceeding effectively 
avoids the constitutionally guaranteed right to have matters tried 
by a jury of one's peers, it has been the manifest policy of the 
courts of this state not to allow Summary Judgment, except in clear 
cases when the elimination of a right to trial would not violate 
fundamental rights. See FMA Acceptance Co. v. Leatherby Insurance 
Co., Inc., 594 P.2d 1332 at 1334 (Utah 1979). 
5. Summary Judgment is rarely an appropriate remedy in a 
negligence case. See FMA case, supra. at page 1335. 
6. It should be incumbent upon the trial court to reasonably 
articulate the basis for granting a motion for Summary Judgment, 
Retherford v. A.T. & T. Communications, 844 P.2d 949 at 958, f.n. 
4 (Utah 1992). 
Applying the foregoing legal standards to the facts of this 
case, it should be apparent that there is a legitimate issue of 
fact as to the permanent partial disability of Mrs. Vigil. 
It is of no moment whether the defendant has properly 
characterized this case as an "improbable" case, or one in which 
the present evidence may tend to suggest that Mrs. Vigil cannot 
meet her burden of proof at trial. While Mrs. Vigil would disagree 
with the Appellee's apparent position, the sole legal issue under 
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Rule 56 remains: "Is there before the trial court a sufficient 
quantum of evidence to raise a reasonable question of fact, or 
reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence, to preclude Summary 
Judgment." 
It would be inappropriate under Utah Law for this Court to 
create a doctrine, as suggested by the Appellee, that a basis for 
Ruling against Mrs. Vigil under Rule 56 can be found where there 
may appear a "strong likelihood" or "high probability" that she may 
not succeed at trial. Such an outcome determinative standard is 
manifestly contrary to the law of Summary Judgments as previously 
developed by the Appellate Courts of this state. 
Finally, within the factual setting for this Summary Judgment 
proceeding, Mr. Nelson has repeatedly insisted that Mrs. Vigil's 
Affidavit stating she did not suffer any of her present symptoms 
prior to the collision should be somehow excluded as incompetent 
testimony. In addition to the authorities previously cited by 
Appellant in her Brief in Chief (see particularly Riggens v. 
Bechtel Power Corp.
 r 727 P.2d 819 at 824 [Wash. App. 1986]) 
supporting the general rule that a party may testify as to her own 
physical symptoms, the onset of such symptoms relative to the 
accident at issue, and the persistence of such symptoms; Mrs. Vigil 
would further refer the Court to the cases of Martin v. Douglas 
County Lumber Co.
 r 476 P. 2d 940 at 941 (Or. App. 1970) and Sharp v. 
Milwaukee & Suburban Transport Corp.r 118 N.W.2d 905 at 913 (Wis. 
1963) to support the admission of her testimony. 
In the Sharp case, infra., at 913, the Court held: 
10 
"The strongest piece of evidence from 
plaintiff's standpoint was her own testimony 
that she had no symptoms of tennis elbow prior 
to the accident." 
From the foregoing, it may be seen that for Summary Judgment 
purposes the Affidavit of Mrs. Vigil was alone sufficient to raise 
a disputed issue of fact, or reasonable inference from fact, as to 
the existence of permanent partial disability arising out of the 
collision with Mr. Nelson. 
Further, the submission of the Vigil Affidavit has 
significance to the Rule 59 issue in that such Affidavit, while 
perhaps not critical as a trial issue, was significant and decisive 
for a Rule 56 proceeding and was, therefore, improperly excluded or 
improperly not considered as new evidence under the applicable Rule 
59 standards as applied to a Rule 56 proceeding. 
REQUIREMENT FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
Mrs. Vigil believes that the requirements of Rule 4-
501(3) (a) (b) & (c) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration 
pertaining to Oral Arguments is not discretionary with the trial 
court. Subparagraph (c) clearly states: 
"Such requests shall be granted unless the Court finds 
that: (a) the Motion or Opposition to the Motion is 
frivolous; or (b) that the dispositive issue or set of 
issues governing the granting or denial of Motion has 
been authoritatively decided." [emphasis added] 
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In this case, regardless of how the Court may ultimately rule 
upon the merits, no reasonable person could believe that the issues 
presented to the trial court and fully briefed and set-out were 
frivolous. There is a clear Affidavit, as well as deposition 
testimony of Dr. McGlothlin, supporting the fact there was 
permanent partial disability suffered by the plaintiff. A 
frivolous claim is, by definition, one which does not have any 
basis in fact or manifestly disregards known law and does not 
suggest any new or novel application of such law to the facts. 
Neither of these badges of a frivolous application are extant in 
this case. 
The second category which may exclude the granting of an oral 
argument under Rule 501-3(c) from a mandatory basis is that a 
dispositive issue or set of issues governing the granting or denial 
has been authoritatively decided. This subcategory would seem to 
have no application to a fact determinative situation wherein the 
Court is not dealing with a legal standard or application which is 
definitive, but is grappling with the proper application or 
interpretation of disputed facts. 
Consequently, Mrs. Vigil would assert that the language of 
subparagraph (c) of Rule 501 is mandatory in this case and that the 
trial court abused its discretion in denying oral argument when 
properly requested on the Motion for New Trial. Mrs. Vigil further 
believes the previously cited case of Gilmor v. Cummings, 806 P.2d 
1205 at 1208 (Ut. App. 1991) is instructive in that this Court did 
find a denial of the right to file a responsive pleading under Rule 
12 
501 to amount to an abuse of discretion under that Rule. It was no 
less an abuse of discretion to wrongfully deny oral argument on a 
final dispositive motion when neither of the two exceptions 
analyzed above are applicable. 
RULE 59 AND RULE 52fal STANDARDS 
Mrs. Vigil does not wish to reargue or restate prior arguments 
as to the application of Rule 52(a) requiring a writing to support 
a Summary Judgment ruling or Rule 59 as to the proper basis for 
granting a new trial or amending a judgment based upon new facts or 
error in the application of the law. Mrs. Vigil would only reply 
to the Brief of Appellee by stating that it is simply not 
sufficient for Appellee to say that Mrs. Vigil's Rule 59 Motion is 
merely an attempt to reargue the case. 
The Rule 59 Motion is not a reargument when the moving party 
informs the trial court that the trial court made a material error 
of law and the applicable legal standard to be applied, as was done 
in this case. Neither is it a simple reargument when the moving 
party represents to the Court a supplemental Affidavit confirming 
under oath the position of the party ruled against. See discussion 
above, page 8 and 9, on the factual significance of the Vigil 
Affidavit. 
In this case there was not an attempt at reargument, but a 
failed initial attempt at argument. The Rule 59 standard was 
explicitly upheld and applied to Summary Judgment proceedings in 
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the case of Interstate Land Corporation v. Pattersonf 797 P.2d 1101 
at 1105 (Ut. App. 1990) as previously cited. 
As to the Rule 52(a) issue of specific findings, Appellant 
would rely upon her previously cited authority to this Court and 
simply submit that there is no way of determining from the trial 
record whether the Judge relied upon a single basis or multiple 
basis in reaching its decision to grant Summary Judgment against 
this plaintiff; and, therefore, the Rule should have application to 
require some minimal Minute Entry or other basis for Ruling. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the prior brief of Appellant and this Supplemental 
Reply Brief, Appellant believes there are multiple reasons why the 
granting of Summary Judgment was improper in this case, as well as 
the failure to properly review under Rule 59 and Rule 501 of the 
Code of Judicial Administration, and that this Court should require 
this case be remanded to the Trial Court for appropriate 
disposition upon the merits. 
DATED this 2r>i day of July, 1993. 
U#£v> fr ukt-W^\ 
JULJ#N D. JENSMf 
At torney f o r ^ p e l l a n t 
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ADDENDUM OF CITED STATUTE AND RULES 
vice or accommodation is not assigned a unit value or the 75th percentile 
charge under the relative value study, the value of the service or accom-
modation shall equal the reasonable cost of the same or similar service or 
accommodation in the most populous county of this state. 
(c) This subsection does not preclude the department from adopting a 
schedule already established or a schedule prepared by persons outside 
the department, if it meets the requirements of this subsection. 
(d) Every insurer shall report to the Commissioner of Insurance any 
patterns of overcharging, excessive treatment, or other improper actions 
by a health provider within 30 days after such insurer has knowledge of 
such pattern. 
(e) In disputed cases, a court on its own motion or on the motion of 
either party may designate an impartial medical panel of not more than 
three licensed physicians to examine the claimant and testify on the issue 
of the reasonable value of the claimant's medical services or expenses. 
(3) Medical expenses as provided for in Subsection (l)(a) and in Subsection 
31A-22-309(l)(e) include expenses for any nonmedical remedial care and 
treatment rendered in accordance with a recognized religious method of heal-
ing. 
(4) This section does not prohibit the issuance of policies of insurance pro-
viding coverages greater than the minimum coverage required under this 
chapter nor does it require the segregation of those minimum coverages from 
other coverages in the same policy. 
(5) Deductibles are not permitted with respect to the insurance coverages 
required under this section. 
History: C. 1953, 31A-22-307, enacted by sentence in Subsection (2)(a), added present 
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 27; 1986, ch. 204, § 159; Subsection (2)(d) and redesignated former Sub-
1989, ch. 261, § 13; 1990, ch. 327, § 8; 1991, section (2)(d) as present Subsection (2)(e) and 
ch. 74, § 7. made minor stylistic changes in Subsection 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend- (i)(a) a ^ i n the second sentence in Subsection 
ment, effective April 29, 1991, inserted "main- (2)(a). 
taining, and administering" in the next-to-last 
31A-22-309. Limitations, exclusions, and conditions to per-
sonal injury protection. 
(1) A person who has or is required to have direct benefit coverage under a 
policy which includes personal injury protection may not maintain a cause of 
action for general damages arising out of personal injuries alleged to have 
been caused by an automobile accident, except where the person has sustained 
one or more of the following: 
(a) death; 
(b) dismemberment; 
(c) permanent disability; 
(d) permanent disfigurement; or 
(e) medical expenses to a person in excess of $3,000. 
(2) (a) Any insurer issuing personal injury protection coverage under this 
part may only exclude from this coverage benefits: 
(i) for any injury sustained by the insured while occupying another 
motor vehicle owned by or furnished for the regular use of the in-
sured or a resident family member of the insured and not insured 
under the policy; 
125 
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(ii) for any injury sustained by any person while operating the 
insured motor vehicle without the express or implied consent of the 
insured or while not in lawful possession of the insured motor vehi-
cle; 
(iii) to any injured person, if the person's conduct contributed to his 
injury: 
(A) by intentionally causing injury to himself; or 
(B) while committing a felony; 
(iv) for any injury sustained by any person arising out of the use of 
any motor vehicle while located for use as a residence or premises; 
(v) for any injury due to war, whether or not declared, civil war, 
insurrection, rebellion or revolution, or to any act or condition inci-
dent to any of the foregoing; or 
(vi) for any injury resulting from the radioactive, toxic, explosive, 
or other hazardous properties of nuclear materials, 
(b) The provisions of this subsection do not limit the exclusions which 
may be contained in other types of coverage. 
(3) The benefits payable to any injured person under Section 31A-22-307 
are reduced by: 
(a) any benefits which that person receives or is entitled to receive as a 
result of an accident covered in this code under any workers' compensa-
tion or similar statutory plan; and 
(b) any amounts which that person receives or is entitled to receive 
from the United States or any of its agencies because he is on active duty 
in the military service. 
(4) When a person injured is also an insured party under any other policy, 
including those policies complying with this part, primary coverage is given 
by the policy insuring the motor vehicle in use during the accident. 
(5) Payment of the benefits provided for in Section 31A-22-307 shall be 
made on a monthly basis as expenses are incurred. Benefits for any period are 
overdue if they are not paid within 30 days after the insurer receives reason-
able proof of the fact and amount of expenses incurred during the period. If 
reasonable proof is not supplied as to the entire claim, the amount supported 
by reasonable proof is overdue if not paid within 30 days after that proof is 
received by the insurer. Any part or all of the remainder of the claim that is 
later supported by reasonable proof is also overdue if not paid within 30 days 
after the proof is received by the insurer. If the insurer fails to pay the ex-
penses when due, these expenses shall bear interest at the rate of Vh% per 
month after the due date. The person entitled to the benefits may bring an 
action in contract to recover the expenses plus the applicable interest. If the 
insurer is required by the action to pay any overdue benefits and interest, the 
insurer is also required to pay a reasonable attorney's fee to the claimant. 
(6) Every policy providing personal injury protection coverage is subject to 
the following: 
(a) that where the insured under the policy is or would be held legally 
liable for the personal injuries sustained by any person to whom benefits 
required under personal injury protection have been paid by another in-
surer, including the Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah, the insurer of 
the person who would be held legally liable shall reimburse the other 
insurer for the payment, but not in excess of the amount of damages 
recoverable; and 
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shall be decided by mandatory, binding arbitration between tne mburwa. 
History: C. 1953, 31A-22-309, enacted by Subsection (2)(a)(i), which read: "for any inju-
re 1985, ch. 242, § 27; 1986, ch. 204, § 160; ries sustained by the injured while occupying 
1988 (2nd S.S.), ch. 10, § 10; 1991, ch. 74, § 8; another motor vehicle owned by the insured 
1992, ch. 230, § 9. and not insured under the policy." 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend- The 1992 amendment, effective April 27, 
inent, effective April 29,1991, made minor sty- 1992, inserted "or is required to have" near the 
listic changes in Subsection (1) and rewrote beginning of Subsection (1). 
PART IV 
LIFE INSURANCE AND ANNUITIES 
31A-22-403. Incontestability. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Estoppel of, or waiver by, issuer of 
life insurance policy to assert defense of lack of 
insurable interest, 86 A.L.R.4th 828. 
31A-22-411. Contracts providing variable benefits. 
(1) (a) Any contract which provides for payment of benefits in variable 
amounts shall contain a statement of the essential features of the proce-
dure to be followed by the insurer in determining the dollar amount of the 
variable benefits. The contract shall contain: 
(i) appropriate nonforfeiture benefits in lieu of those required by 
either Section 31A-22-408 or 31A-22-409; 
(ii) appropriate reinstatement provisions in lieu of those required 
by Section 31A-22-407; and 
(iii) grace period provisions appropriate to that type of contract in 
lieu of those required by Section 31A-22-402. 
(b) This individual contract and any certificate issued under a group 
contract shall state that the dollar amount may decrease or increase and 
shall conspicuously display on its first page a statement that the benefits 
under the contract are payable on a variable basis, with a statement 
specifying where the details of the variable provisions are found in the 
contract. 
(c) Life insurance and annuity policies with variable benefits issued 
under a separate account shall, on either the application or the policy, 
state that the insurer's liabilities with respect to variable benefits under 
the policy are subject to satisfaction only out of the insurer's variable 
account assets. 
(2) Any contract subject to Subsection (1) shall state whether it may be 
amended as to investment policy, voting rights, and conduct of the business 
and affairs of any segregated account. Subject to any preemptive provision of 
federal law, this type of amendment is subject to filing under Section 
31A-21-201 and approval by a majority of the policyholders in the segregated 
account. 
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Written instructions. 
—Failure to tender. 
Waiver. 
Where plaintiff had failed to tender a writ-
ten instruction on burden of proof he could not 
claim error in the lack of such instruction. Ful-
ler v. Zinik Sporting Goods Co., 538 P.2d 1036 
(Utah 1975). 
Cited in Wellman v. Noble, 12 Utah 2d 350, 
366 P.2d 701 (1961); Hill v. Cloward, 14 Utah 
2d 55, 377 P.2d 186 (1962); Ortega v. Thomas, 
14 Utah 2d 296, 383 P.2d 406 (1963); Meier v. 
Christensen, 15 Utah 2d 182, 389 P.2d 734 
(1964); Memmott v. U.S. Fuel Co., 22 Utah 2d 
356, 453 P.2d 155 (1969); Telford v. Newell J. 
Olsen & Sons Constr. Co., 25 Utah 2d 270, 480 
P.2d 462 (1971); Flynn v. W.P. Harlin Constr. 
Co., 29 Utah 2d 327, 509 P.2d 356 (1973); 
McGinn v. Utah Power & Light Co., 529 P.2d 
423 (Utah 1974); Henderson v. Meyer, 533 P.2d 
290 (Utah 1975); Lamkin v. Lynch, 600 P.2d 
530 (Utah 1979); State v. Hall, 671 P.2d 201 
(Utah 1983); Highland Constr. Co. v. Union 
Pac. R.R., 683 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1984); Gill v. 
Timm, 720 P.2d 1352 (Utah 1986); Penrod v. 
Carter, 737 P.2d 199 (Utah 1987); King v. 
Fereday, 739 P.2d 618 (Utah 1987); State v. 
Cox, 751 P.2d 1152 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); 
Ramon ex rel. Ramon v. Fair, 770 P.2d 131 
(Utah 1989); Anton v. Thomas, 806 P.2d 744 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991); Reeves v. Gentile, 813 
P.2d 111 (Utah 1991); Hodges v. Gibson Prods. 
Co., 811 P.2d 151 (Utah 1991); Home Sav. & 
Loan v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 817 P.2d 341 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 75A Am. Jur. 2d Trial 
§ 1077 et seq. 
C.J.S. — 88 C.J.S. Trial §§ 266 to 448. 
A.L.R. — Propriety and prejudicial effect of 
instructions in civil case as affected by the 
manner in which they are written, 10 A.L.R.3d 
501. 
Sufficiency of evidence, in personal injury 
action, to prove future pain and suffering and 
to warrant instructions to jury thereon, 18 
A.L.R.3d 10. 
Sufficiency of evidence, in personal injury 
action, to prove impairment of earning capac-
ity and to warrant instructions to jury thereon, 
18 A.L.R.3d 88. 
Sufficiency of evidence, in personal injury 
action, to prove permanence of injuries and to 
warrant instructions to jury thereon, 18 
A.L.R.3d 170. 
Propriety and effect, in eminent domain pro-
ceeding, of instruction to the jury as to land-
owner's unwillingness to sell property, 20 
A.L.R.3d 1081. 
Verdict-urging instructions in civil case 
stressing desirability and importance of agree-
ment, 38 A.L.R.3d 1281. 
Verdict-urging instructions in civil case 
commenting on weight of majority view or au-
thorizing compromise, 41 A.L.R.3d 845. 
Verdict-urging instructions in civil case ad-
monishing jurors to refrain from intransigence 
or reflecting on integrity or intelligence of ju-
rors, 41 A.L.R.3d 1154. 
Construction of statutes or rules making 
mandatory the use of pattern or uniform ap-
proved jury instructions, 49 A.L.R.3d 128. 
Necessity and propriety of instructing on al-
ternative theories of negligence or breach of 
warranty, where instruction on strict liability 
in tort is given in products liability case, 52 
A.L.R.3d 101. 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, construc-
tion and effect of provision in Rule 51, and sim-
ilar state rules, that counsel be given opportu-
nity to make objections to instructions out of 
hearing of jury, 1 A.L.R. Fed. 310. 
Key Numbers. — Trial «=» 182 to 296. 
Rule 52. Findings by the court. 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an 
advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its 
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 
58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall simi-
larly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the 
grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of 
review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, 
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given 
to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. 
The findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be 
considered as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of 
fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court follow-
ing the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of 
decision filed by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 4Kb). The 
court shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for its 
decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 
when the motion is based on more than one ground. 
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after 
entry of judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional find-
ixigs and may ameuu vu^j^^.^^^
 w ^ 
a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are maae 
in actions tried by the court without a jury, the question of the sufficiency of 
the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not 
the party raising the question has made in the district court an objection to 
such findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a motion for judg-
ment, or a motion for a new trial. 
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Except in actions 
for divorce, findings of fact and conclusions of law may be waived by the 
parties to an issue of fact: 
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial; 
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause; 
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes. 
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 52, F.R.C.P. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Adoption. 
—Abandonment of contract. 
—Advisory verdict. 
—Breach of contract. 
—Child custody. 
—Contempt. 
—Credibility of witnesses. 
—Denial of motion. 
—Divorce decree modifications. 
—Easement. 
—Evidentiary disputes. 
—Juvenile action. 
—Material issues. 
Harmless error. 
—Submission by prevailing party. 
Court's discretion. 
—Water dispute. 
Findings of state engineer. 
Amendment. 
—Motion. 
Caption. 
Conformance with original findings. 
New trial. 
Notice of appeal. 
Time. 
Tolling of appeal period. 
When made. 
—Overruling or vacation. 
Another district judge. 
Lack of notice. 
Child custody awards. 
Criminal cases. 
Criminal contempt. 
Effect. 
—Preclusion of summary judgment. 
—Relation to pleadings. 
Failure to object to findings. 
How findings entered. 
Judgments upon multiple claims or parties. 
Judicial review. 
—Equity cases. 
—Standard of review. 
• Conclusions of law. 
Criminal cases. 
Criminal trials. 
Findings of facts by jury. 
Intent. 
Juvenile proceedings. 
Purpose of rule. 
Stipulations. 
Sufficiency. 
—Allegations of pleadings. 
—Burden on appeal. 
—Found insufficient. 
Vacation of judgment. 
—Found sufficient. 
—Opinion or memorandum of decision. 
—Recitals of procedures. 
—Technical error. 
—Ultimate facts. 
Summary judgment. 
—Statement of grounds. 
Waiver. 
—Failure of court. 
When filed. 
—Tardy filing. 
Cited. 
Adoption. 
—Abandonment of contract. 
In a contract action by a real estate broker 
for his commission, where the defendant raises 
the issue of abandonment of the contract by his 
answer, the court should make findings on the 
issue of abandonment. Failure of the trial court 
to make findings of fact on all material issues 
is reversible error where it is prejudicial. 
Gaddis Inv. Co. v. Morrison, 3 Utah 2d 43, 278 
P.2d 284 (1954). 
—Advisory verdict 
The trial court has the responsibility to 
make findings of fact and conclusions of law, 
notwithstanding the advisory verdict of a jury. 
Romrell v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 611 P.2d 
392 (Utah 1980). 
—Breach of contract. 
Where plaintiffs, in action for breach of con-
tract, requested finding by court on material 
issue as to whether the foundation of their 
house had been located in accordance with zon-
ing ordinances and restrictive covenants, it 
was the duty of the court to make such a find-
ing. Quagliana v. Exquisite Home Bldrs., Inc., 
538 P.2d 301 (Utah 1975). 
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set aside must proffer some defense of at least 
sufficient ostensible merit to justify a trial on 
that issue. Downey State Bank v. Major-
Blakeney Corp., 545 P.2d 507 (Utah 1976). 
—Setting aside proper. 
Where plaintiff served defendant with a 
summons, and left a copy with the defendant 
which was not the same as the original, the 
court had jurisdiction but sufficient confusion 
was created so that a motion to set aside the 
default judgment should have been granted 
and the defendant allowed to plead consistent 
with our declared policy that in case of uncer-
tainty, default judgments should be set aside to 
allow trial on the merits. Locke v. Peterson, 3 
Utah 2d 415, 285 R2d 1111 (1955). 
Default judgment and writ of garnishment 
were properly set aside where trial court failed 
to obtain jurisdiction over defendant because 
summons was not timely issued. Fibreboard 
Paper Prods. Corp. v. Dietrich, 25 Utah 2d 65, 
475 P.2d 1005 (1970). 
Where appellants, plaintiffs in a civil action, 
promptly objected to date set for trial on the 
ground that their counsel had an already 
scheduled appearance in another court on that 
date, but due to fact that there were no law or 
motion days between time objection was filed 
and trial date, objection was never heard, re-
fusal to set aside default judgment entered 
when appellants failed to appear on trial date 
was an abuse of discretion. Griffiths v. Ham-
mon, 560 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1977). 
Time for appeal. 
Under former Rule 73(h) the time for appeal 
from a default judgment in a city court ran 
from the date of notice of entry of such judg-
ment, rather than from the date of judgment. 
Buckner v. Main Realty & Ins. Co., 4 Utah 2d 
124, 288 P.2d 786 (1955) (but see Central Bank 
& Trust Co. v. Jensen, supra, and Rule 58A(d)). 
Cited in Utah Sand & Gravel Prods. Corp. v. 
Tolbert, 16 Utah 2d 407, 402 P.2d 703 (1965); 
J.P.W. Enters., Inc. v. Naef, 604 P.2d 486 
(Utah 1979); Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92 (Utah 
1986). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Brigham Young Law Review. — Reason-
able Assurance of Actual Notice Required for 
In Personam Default Judgment in Utah: Gra-
ham v. Sawaya, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 937. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments 
§§ 1152 to 1213. 
C.J.S. — 49 C.J.S. Judgments §§ 187 to 218. 
A.L.R. — Necessity of taking proof as to lia-
bility against defaulting defendant, 8 A.L.R.3d 
1070. 
Appealability of order setting aside, or refus-
ing to set aside, default judgment, 8 A.L.R.3d 
1272. 
Defaulting defendant's right to notice and 
hearing as to determination of amount of dam-
ages, 15 A.L.R.3d 586. 
Opening default or default judgment claimed 
to have been obtained because of attorney's 
mistake as to time or place of appearance, 
trial, or filing of necessary papers, 21 A.L.R.3d 
1255. 
Failure to give notice of application for de-
fault judgment where notice is required only 
by custom, 28 A.L.R.3d 1383. 
Failure of party or his attorney to appear at 
pretrial conference, 55 A.L.R.3d 303. 
Default judgments against the United States 
under Rule 55(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 55 A.L.R. Fed. 190. 
Key Numbers. — Judgment <^» 92 to 134. 
Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of 
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any 
part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least 
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the 
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist 
versy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It 
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without sub-
stantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or 
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the 
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be 
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Support-
ing and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set 
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirma-
tively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. 
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affida-
vit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affida-
vits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or 
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judg-
ment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits 
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of 
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule 
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall 
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the 
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused 
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or 
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to Cross-References. — Contempt generally, 
Rule 56, F.R.C.P. §§ 78-7-18, 78-32-1 et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS Availability of motion. 
Affidavit Cross-motions. 
-Contents. Damages. 
-Corporation. r ^ T T f • 
-Experts. Disputed facts. 
—Inconsistency with deposition. Evidence. 
-Necessity of opposing affidavits. —Facts considered. 
Resting on pleadings. —Improper evidence. 
-Objection. ~£°°f; r 
—Sufficiency. —Weight of testimony. 
Hearsay and opinion testimony. Improper party plaintiff. 
—Superseding pleadings. * s s u e °f ^act-
—Unpleaded defenses. —Corporate existence. 
—Verified pleading. —Deeds. 
—Waiver of right to contest. —Lease as security. 
—When unavailable. Judicial attitude. 
Exclusive control of facts. Motion for new trial. 
—Who may make. Motion to dismiss. 
Affirmative defense. Motion to reconsider. 
Answers to interrogatories. Notice. 
Appeal. —Provision not jurisdictional. 
—Adversely affected party. —Waiver of defect. 
—Standard of review. Procedural due process. 
Attorney's fees. Purpose. 
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upon the docket by the clerk, such judgment shall, to the extent of such 
satisfaction, be discharged and cease to be a lien. In case of partial satisfac-
tion, if any execution shall thereafter be issued on the judgment, such execu-
tion shall be endorsed with a memorandum of such partial satisfaction and 
shall direct the officer to collect only the residue thereof, or to collect only 
from the judgment debtors remaining liable thereon. 
(e) Filing transcript of satisfaction in other counties. When any satis-
faction of a judgment shall have been entered on the judgment docket of the 
county where such judgment was first docketed, a certified transcript of satis-
faction, or a certificate by the clerk showing such satisfaction, may be filed 
with the clerk of the district court in any other county where the judgment 
may have been docketed. Thereupon a similar entry in the judgment docket 
shall be made by the clerk of such court; and such entry shall have the same 
effect as in the county where the same was originally entered. 
Compiler's Notes. — There is no federal 
rule covering this subject matter. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS ment of a judgment in his favor, the satisfac-
Court. tion and discharge operated to satisfy and dis-
Duty. charge everything merged in and adjudicated 
Attachment. by the judgment. Sierra Nev. Mill Co. v. Keith 
Effect. O'Brien Co., 48 Utah 12, 156 P.2d 943 (1916). 
-Acceptance of full payment.
 Q w n e r Qr a t t o 
Owner or attorney. * 
—Vacation of satisfaction. —Vacation of satisfaction. 
Hearing. Hearing. 
Court Trie recorded satisfaction of judgment signed 
Duty. by judgment creditor cannot be vacated with-
Attachment.
 0ut action and hearing in equity, and the lien 
Court had duty to make order directing par-
 0f a n attorney against the proceeds of the judg-
tial satisfaction of judgment to extent of money
 m e n t does not include his personal right to exe-
collected through attachment proceeding.
 c u t e ^ ^ t h e j u d g m e n t debtor. Utah C.V. 
Blake v. Farrell, 31 Utah 110,86 P. 805 (1906).
 F e d c * e d i t U n i o n v* J e n k i n S j 5 2 8 R 2 d 1 1 8 7 
Effect. (Utah 1974). 
—Acceptance of full payment 
When plaintiff voluntarily accepted full pay-
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments judgment against one joint tort-feasor as re-
§ 979 et seq. lease of others, 40 A.L.R.3d 1181. 
C.J.S. — 49 C.J.S. Judgments §§ 574 to 584. Key Numbers. — Judgment <*=» 891 to 899. 
A.L.R. — Voluntary payment into court of 
Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment. 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be 
granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of 
the following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an 
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been 
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of 
law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new 
judgment: 
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, 
or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was 
prevented from having a fair trial. 
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors 
have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a 
finding on any question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a 
determination by chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be 
proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors. 
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have 
guarded against. 
plication, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered 
and produced at the trial. 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given 
under the influence of passion or prejudice. 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, 
or that it is against law. 
(7) Error in law. 
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later 
than 10 days after the entry of the judgment. 
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is 
made under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affida-
vit. Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be 
served with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service 
within which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the affida-
vits or opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional 
period not exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause shown or by 
the parties by written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits. 
(d) OR initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment 
the court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it 
might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall 
specify the grounds therefor. 
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the 
judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 59, F.R C.P. 
Cross-References. — Fee for filing motion 
for new trial, § 21-2-2. 
Harmless error not ground for new trial, 
Rule 61. 
Abandonment of motion. 
Accident or surprise. 
Arbitration awards. 
Caption on motion for new trial. 
Correction of insufficient or informal verdict. 
Correction of record. 
Costs. 
Decision against law. 
Discretion of trial court. 
Effect of order granting new trial. 
Effect of untimely motion. 
Evidence. 
—Sufficiency. 
Excessive or inadequate damages. 
—Punitive damages. 
Failure to object to findings of fact. 
Filing of affidavits. 
Grounds for new trial. 
—Particularization in motion. 
Incompetence or negligence of counsel. 
Misconduct of jury. 
Motion to alter or amend judgment. 
Motion to be presented to trial court. 
Newly discovered evidence. 
New trial on initiative of court. 
Procedure for questioning grant of new trial. 
Reconsideration of motion for new trial. 
Settlement bars appeal. 
Summary judgment. 
Time for motion. 
Tolling time for appeal. 
Waiver. 
Juror's competency as witness as to validity 
of verdict or indictment, Rules of Evidence, 
Rule 606. 
Abandonment of motion. 
Abandonment of motion for new trial must 
be intentional, and the facts must indicate this 
intention. Bailey v. Sound Lab, Inc., 694 P.2d 
1043 (Utah 1984). 
Accident or surprise. 
This section requires that the moving party 
show that ordinary prudence was exercised to 
guard against the accident or surprise. Powers 
v. Gene's Bldg. Materials, Inc., 567 P.2d 174 
(Utah 1977). 
Plaintiff was not entitled to a new trial on 
the basis of surprise concerning testimony of 
the defendant's expert witness where the 
plaintiff failed to object to the testimony either 
before, or immediately after, it was given. 
Jensen v. Thomas, 570 P.2d 695 (Utah 1977). 
A "surprise" at trial which could have been 
easily guarded against by utilization of avail-
able discovery procedures may not serve as a 
ground for a new trial under Subdivison (a)(3). 
Anderson v. Bradley, 590 P.2d 339 (Utah 
1979). 
Failure to interpose a timely objection to tes-
timony challenged on the ground of surprise 
would be a sufficient reason to deny a motion 
for a new trial on that ground. Chournos v. 
D'Agnillo, 642 P.2d 710 (Utah 1982). 
Claim of error based on accident or surprise, 
never brought to the attention of the trial court 
by objection, motion to strike, motion for a new 
trial, or otherwise, was asserted for the first 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS Cited. 
in Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-15, 
[Amended effective January 15,1990; 
ary 1, 1993.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-
ment renumbered this rule, formerly Rule 
£405; added the phrase beginning "and to" un-
ier "Applicability"; added "Upon initial appli-
cation, and thereafter" to the beginning of Sub-
jivision (1); in Subdivision (1)(C), inserted the 
subdivision designation (i) and added Subdivi-
sions (ii) through (vii); redesignated former 
Subdivision (1)(D) as Subdivision (l)(C)(xiii); 
redesignated former Subdivision (1)(E) as Sub-
Jivision (1XD); redesignated former Subdi vi-
rions (1)(F) through (J) as Subdivisions 
(l)(C)(viii) through (xii) and in Subdivision 
[viii) substituted "existing in Utah or any 
uther state" for "in any court of the state"; 
added Subdivisions (2)(A) through (C), (3), (4), 
ind (5)(A) and the first two sentences in Subdi-
vision (5)(B), making former Subdivision (3) 
the third sentence in present Subdivision 
(5)(B); deleted former Subdivision (4), provid-
ing for full faith and credit among courts for 
orders qualifying sureties; redesignated former 
Subdivisions (5) through (7) as Subdivisions 
(5KC) and (D) and (6); substituted "circuit" for 
"court" in Subdivision (5)(C); substituted "pre-
siding judge" for "court" in two places in Subdi-
vision (5)(D); substituted "March 1st" for "Feb-
ruary 28th" in Subdivision (6); added Subdivi-
sion (7); and made stylistic changes through-
out. 
The 1991 amendment in Subdivision (1) 
added "or if the statement is made on behalf of 
April 15,1991; January 1,1992; Febru-
a business or corporation, a statement that the 
business or corporation" to the introductory 
language of paragraph (C) and made stylistic 
changes; rewrote Subdivision (2) to delete lan-
guage relating to appraisals and inserted "pre-
pared by a certified public accountant"; redes-
ignated former Subdivision (2)(C) as present 
Subdivision (3), added present Subdivision (4), 
and renumbered the remaining subdivisions 
accordingly, making appropriate reference 
changes throughout; in present Subdivision 
(3), deleted "audited" before "financial state-
ment" and substituted "surety" for "company" 
in the first sentence and substituted "the 
value" for "a ratio of bond dollars to letter of 
credit dollars" in the second sentence; in 
present Subdivision (5), substituted "current 
assets" for "real assets" in two places; and re-
wrote present Subdivision (6) to delete a table 
setting out the ratio of bond dollars outstand-
ing to net worth value. 
The 1992 amendment substituted "Commer-
cial" for "qualifications of in the rule heading, 
inserted "re-qualification and disqualification" 
and "commercial" in the Intent section, and 
substantially rewrote the rule. 
The 1993 amendment, effective February 1, 
1993, in Subdivision (6) added the designation 
(A), deleted "the lesser of $500,000 or" after 
"exceed" in Subdivision (A), and added Subdi-
vision (B). 
Rule 4-408. Locations of trial courts of record. 
Intent: 
To designate locations of trial courts of record. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to all trial courts of record. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Each county seat and the following municipalities are hereby desig-
n e d as locations of trial courts of record: American Fork; Bountiful; Cedar 
City; Clearfield; Kaysville; Layton; Murray; Orem; Park City; Roosevelt; Roy; 
Salem; Sandy; Spanish Fork; West Valley City. 
(2) Subject to limitations imposed by law, a trial court of record of any 
object matter jurisdiction may hold court in any location designated by this 
rule. 
(Added effective January 1, 1992.) 
ARTICLE 5. 
CIVIL PRACTICE. 
Rule 4-501. Motions. 
Jjtent: 
pTo establish a uniform procedure for filing motions, supporting memoranda 
***** documents with the court. 
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To establish a uniform procedure for requesting and scheduling hearings on 
dispositive motions. 
To establish a procedure for expedited dispositions. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to motion practice in all district and circuit courts 
except proceedings before the court commissioners and the small claims de-
partment of the circuit court. This rule does not apply to petitions for habeas 
corpus or other forms of extraordinary relief. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Filing and service of motions and memoranda. 
(a) Motion and supporting memoranda. All motions, except uncon-
tested or ex-parte matters, shall be accompanied by a memorandum of 
points and authorities appropriate affidavits, and copies of or citations by 
page number to relevant portions of depositions, exhibits or other docu-
ments relied upon in support of the motion. Memoranda supporting or 
opposing a motion shall not exceed ten pages in length exclusive of the 
"statement of material facts" as provided in paragraph (2), except as 
waived by order of the court on ex-parte application. If an ex-parte appli-
cation is made to file an over-length memorandum, the application shall 
state the length of the principal memorandum, and if the memorandum is 
in excess of ten pages, the application shall include a summary of the 
memorandum, not to exceed five pages. 
(b) Memorandum in opposition to motion. The responding party 
shall file and serve upon all parties within ten days after service of a 
motion, a memorandum in opposition to the motion, and all supporting 
documentation. If the responding party fails to file a memorandum in 
opposition to the motion within ten days after service of the motion, the 
moving party may notify the clerk to submit the matter to the court for 
decision as provided in paragraph (l)(d) of this rule. 
(c) Reply memorandum. The moving party may serve and file a reply 
memorandum within five days after service of the responding party's 
memorandum. 
(d) Notice to submit for decision. Upon the expiration of the five-day 
period to file a reply memorandum, either party may notify the Clerk to 
submit the matter to the court for decision. The notification shall be in 
the form of a separate written pleading and captioned "Notice to Submit 
for Decision." The notification shall contain a certificate of mailing to all 
parties. If neither party files a notice, the motion will not be submitted for 
decision. 
(2) Motions for summary judgment. 
(a) Memorandum in support of a motion. The points and authori-
ties in support of a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a 
section that contains a concise statement of material facts as to which 
movant contends no genuine issue exists. The facts shall be stated in 
separate numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to those portions 
of the record upon which the movant relies. 
(b) Memorandum in opposition to a motion. The points and author-
ities in opposition to a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a 
section that contains a concise statement of material facts as to which the 
party contends a genuine issue exists. Each disputed fact shall be stated 
in separate numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to those por-
tions of the record upon which the opposing party relies, and, if appli00" 
ble, shall state the numbered sentence or sentences of the movant's facts 
that are disputed. All material facts set forth in the movant's statement 
and properly supported by an accurate reference to the record shall W 
cany controverted by the opposing party's statement. 
(3) Hearings. 
(a) A decision on a motion shall be rendered without a hearing unless 
ordered by the Court, or requested by the parties as provided in para-
graphs (3)(b) or (4) below. 
(b) In cases where the granting of a motion would dispose of the action 
or any issues in the action on the merits with prejudice, either party at 
the time of filing the principal memorandum in support of or in opposition 
to a motion may file a written request for a hearing. 
(c) Such request shall be granted unless the court finds that (a) the 
motion or opposition to the motion is frivolous or (b) that the dispositive 
issue or set of issues governing the granting or denial of the motion has 
been authoritatively decided. 
(d) When a request for hearing is denied, the court shall notify the 
requesting party. When a request for hearing is granted, the court shall 
set the matter for hearing or notify the requesting party that the matter 
shall be heard and the requesting party shall schedule the matter for 
hearing and notify all parties of the date and time. 
(e) In those cases where a hearing is granted, a courtesy copy of the 
motion, memorandum of points and authorities and all documents sup-
porting or opposing the motion shall be delivered to the judge hearing the 
matter at least two working days before the date set for hearing. Copies 
shall be clearly marked as courtesy copies and indicate the date and time 
of the hearing. Courtesy copies shall not be filed with the clerk of the 
court. 
(f) If no written request for a hearing is made at the time the parties 
file their principal memoranda, a hearing on the motion shall be deemed 
waived. 
(g) All dispositive motions shall be heard at least thirty (30) days be-
fore the scheduled trial date. No dispositive motions shall be heard after 
that date without leave of the Court. 
(4) Expedited dispositions. Upon motion and notice and for good cause 
shown, the court may grant a request for an expedited disposition in any case 
where time is of the essence and compliance with the provisions of this rule 
would be impracticable or where the motion does not raise significant legal 
issues and could be resolved summarily. 
(5) Telephone conference. The court on its own motion or at a party's 
request may direct arguments of any motion by telephone conference without 
court appearance. A verbatim record shall be made of all telephone arguments 
and the rulings thereon if requested by counsel. 
(Amended effective January 15, 1990; April 15, 1991.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend- the proposed order" following "supporting docu-
ment rewrote this rule to such an extent that a umentation" in Subdivision (1Kb) and made re-
detailed description is impracticable. lated stylistic changes and inserted "principal" 
The 1991 amendment deleted "and a copy of in Subdivision (3)(b). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS should have been given ten days to respond, as 
When rule applies prescribed by Subdivision (l)(b) of this rule. 
Cited. Gillmor v. Cummings, 806 P.2d 1205 (Utah Ct. 
When rule applies. 
Because the defendants' Rule 56(e) objection Cited in Huston v. Lewis, 818 P.2d 531 
to the plaintiffs first affidavit was framed as a (Utah 1991); Lucero v. Warden of Utah State 
^Parate, written motion to strike, the plaintiff Prison, 841 P.2d 1230 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
